所有权结构对公司绩效的影响.doc

文献原文 The Effect of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance: Additional Evidence This article examines the effect of ownership structure on corporate performance, using stock returns as a measure of performance. Based on the 1988-1992 sample period, we find that the level of insider ownership is positively related to stock returns. This result suggests that as managers equity ownership increases, their interests coincide more with those of outside shareholders. But we also find that the square of the level of insider ownership is inversely related to stock returns, indicating that excessive insider ownership rather hurts corporate performance probably due to the problem associated with managers entrenchment. Finally, we find that stock returns are positively related to institutional ownership, indicating that institutional owners are active in monitoring management. Introduction Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), interest in the relation between corporate performance and the allocation of shares among shareholders has continued to evolve in the finance literature. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), managers natural tendency is to allocate the firms resources in their own best interests, which may conflict with the interests of outside shareholders. As managers equity ownership increases, however, their interests coincide more closely with those of outside shareholders, and hence the conflicts between managers and shareholders are likely to be resolved. Thus, managements equity ownership helps resolve the agency problems and improve the firms performance. I However, several studies suggest that managements ownership does not always have a positive effect on corporate performance. Fama and Jensen (1983) demonstrate various possibilities that managers who own enough stock to dominate the board of directors could expropriate corporate wealth. A large-block shareholder could, for example, pay himself an excessive salary or invest in negative-net-present-value