我国上市公司股票期权激励的实施效应研究 _ 以2006年正式实施股票期权激励的上市公司为例.pdf

ABSTRACT The listed companies in China have begun to introduce stock option incentive system before the share structure reform. However, the results show that its effect is not significant. On the one hand, the origin of stock option incentive is to solve the problem of corporate agency, prompting managers to take the initiative to effectively focus on business development and long-term interests of shareholders.By doing this, companies could achieve the greatest harmonization of the interests of managers and shareholders;On the other hand, stock option incentive is a kind of long-term incentive in the compensation structure, and its object is core staff.This tool is not only good for help ing to retain talent but also help to enforce corporate strategic objectives.Since the 70-80th years of last century, the application of stock option incentive has been widely and effectively carried out in Western countries.With the constant improvement of domestic capital market, and the implementation of a series of laws and regulations relating to stock option incentive in early 2006, the application of stock option incentive in Chinese listed companies gets preliminary conditions. In this background, exploring the effectiveness of stock option incentive is conducive to improve performance and corporate governance structure of the companies. In this paper, i used theories of principal-agent and corporate governance as the research base, and learned from the experts ’research results.Then,in order to explore the effectiveness of stock option incentative,and analyze the relationship between corporate performance and stock option incentative, i chose listed companies that