资本结构与控制报酬激励机制外文翻译.doc

外文 原文 Capital Structure and the Control of Managerial Incentives Material Source:Encyclopedia of Business Author: Alan V.S.Douglas The theory of corporate capital structure has advanced significantly following Modigliani and Miller(1958).The effects of taxes and(direct)bankruptcy costs,though well developed theoretically, appear to play a minor role empirically.The major empirical determinants of capital structure appear to information and agency problems Titman and Wessels(1988),Barclay and Smith 1998).The pioneering theoreticalstudies of these problems include Jensen and Meckling (1976),Myers(1977),Ross(1977)and Myers and Majluf(1984).Jensen and Meckling(1976)show that an entrepreneurial firm can　designed capital structure to minimize the cost of perquisite incentives under equity financing and risk-taking(asset substitution)incentives under debt financing.Myers(1977)shows that debt provides　shareholders with an incentive to under-invest when some of the value accrues to bondholders.Ross(1977)shows that a manager’s personal loss in bankruptcy enables debt levels to convey inside information,and Myers and Majluf (1984)show that shareholders have an incentive to under-invest when　signaling is difficult so that securities are mis-priced. The importance of incentives in each of these theories encouraged other researchers to further distinguish between the managers and owners of large corporations,and to focus on the firm’s ability todesign managerial incentives that mitigate the agency and information problems associated with different capital structures.For example,Dybvig and Zender(1990)employ a principle-agent setting and showthat capital structure is again irrelevant if the owners can provide incentives(compensation)that are independent of capital structure.Although the premise that managerial actions reflect endogenous incentive contracts is highly realistic,there are many reasons why Dybvig and Zender’s results may not hold. One reason,as advanced by