On_the_determinants教程.pdf

ON THE DETERMINANTS, COSTS, AND BENEFITS OF PYRAMIDAL OWNERSHIP: Evidence on Expropriation of minority interests * ** *** Najah Attig , Klaus Fischer , and Yoser Gadhoum Version Mars 2002 Abstract: We investigate the determinants, costs and benefits of corporate affiliation to pyramidal holdings. The phenomenon of firms functioning within a pyramidal holding under removed ultimate owners is pervasive and permanent enough in both Eastern and Western countries, including Canada, to warrant novel investigation. Accordingly, we study some 1,167 listed Canadian firms for the 1994-1996 period, using a logit model to predict the extent to which their characteristics at the outset make it probable that they are, or will be, controlled through a pyramidal structure. Our results suggest that, as expected, pyramidal holdings are headed by distant ultimate owners who seek to amass control and exert opportunistic behavior at the expense of corporate affiliates. Consistent with the hypothesis that limited liability creates a bundle of default options against the bearers of contingent claims, we report that ultimate owners of pyramidal holdings appear to use their “structural leverage” in order to impose excessive risk taking in affiliated firms and maximize the value of their options. In addition, we document that stocks of affiliated firms are less liquid than independent ones. This is deemed to reflect a high level of asymmetric information and agency problems within pyramidal holdings. Furthermore, we find that cash flow rights are highly separated from voting rights in affiliated firms. We also find that corporate policies of a