IPO价格上限管制的激励效应和中介机构的声誉价值--来自我国新股发行市场化改革初期的经验证据(2001-2004).pdfVIP

* IPO 价格上限管制的激励效应与中介机构的声誉价值 ——来自我国新股发行市场化改革初期的经验证据（2001~2004 ） 1 2 陈 俊 ； 陈汉文 （1.浙江大学 管理学院，杭州 310058 ；2.厦门大学 管理学院，厦门 361005 ） 摘 要：本文以我国新股发行市场化改革初期独特的价格上限管制为背景，对作为市场信息中介的审计师声誉价值 的形成及其有效性进行了初步考察。从声誉产品需求和供给的双向视角，研究发现，作为独立的第三方信息鉴证 者，审计师声誉的提高有助于降低抑价折扣，改善新股定价效率；而作为“声誉溢价”，高声誉审计师在新股发行 过程中也确实收取了更高的审计费用。上述研究结果表明，市场化背景下的激励性价格上限管制能够促使市场中 介机构的声誉价值得以显现，并开始在改善市场信息环境进而提高资源配置效率方面扮演了重要角色。研究结论 对新股发行监管市场化和注册会计师行业的发展具有重要的政策参考价值。 关键词：价格上限管制；审计师声誉；发行抑价；声誉溢价；市场化监管 中图分类号：F239 文献标准码： Incentive Effect from IPO’s Price-cap Regulation and Reputation Value of Market Intermediaries: Evidence From from China’s IPO Market, 2001-2004 Chen Jun1 Chen Hanwen2 (1. School of Management, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China; 2. School of Management, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China) Abstract: Focused on unique price-cap regulation （PCR ）at the preliminary stage of Initial Public Offering’s (IPO) marketization reform in China, we examine the effectiveness of auditor reputation from dual perspectives of demand and supply. We find that, on the one hand, auditor reputation is negative correlated with underpricing significantly. On the other hand, auditors with high reputation can charge more audit compensation as “reputation premium”. Our findings indicate that the incentive effect from price-cap regulation of IPO pricing can improve reputation value of market intermediaries, even if in the preliminary stage of IPO’s marketization reform. The results have important meanings to market-oriented supervision of IPO and development of Certified Public Accountant (CPA) industry in China. Key Words: Price-cap regulation; Auditor Reputation; Underpricing; Reputation Premium; Market-oriented