需求和回收努力扰动下闭环供应链定价和协调王银河王旭.pdfVIP

网络出版时间：2013-03-08 10:12 网络出版地址：/kcms/detail/51.1196.TP1012.028.html 需求和回收努力扰动下闭环供应链定价与协调 1 2 王银河 ，王 旭 (1. 重庆大学 机械工程学院, 重庆400030；2. 重庆大学 科技处，重庆400030) 摘 要：针对干扰事件下由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的闭环供应链系统，建立制造商为主导的Stackelberg 博弈模型，首 先分析了数量折扣契约对闭环供应链的协调作用，然后分析了数量折扣契约应对干扰事件的协调作用。结果表明：当干扰事 件引起市场规模、再制造成本、回收努力同时扰动时，原契约具有一定鲁棒性；当扰动超出一定范围时，原有的协调被打破； 为此，给出改进的数量折扣契约具有抗干扰事件性，并讨论闭环供应链成员的最优利润分配策略，最后通过数值实验来验证 结论的有效性。 关键词: 闭环供应链；干扰管理；回收努力程度；数量折扣契约；协调机制 中图分类号：TP301.6 Coordination and price analysis for closed-loop supply chain with market demand and collection effort disruptions 1 2 WANG Yin-he , WANG Xu (1. College of Mechanical Engineering , Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China; 2. Department of Science and Technology, Chongqing University , Chongqing 400044,China) Abstract: Under the disruption event environment, the system of closed-loop supply chain composed the single manufacturer and the single retailer was studied. A Stackelberg game model as the supplier was the leader was established ，the coordination with quantity discount contract was analyzed firstly. Then, the coordination with quantity discount contract under disruptions was studied. It is proved that, the original contracts had certain robustness under a small disruption when the market scale, remanufacturing cost and collection effort were disrupted simultaneously. But the coordination may be broken off when the disruptions exceeded a certain range, and adjusted quantity discount contract was propo