1990绩效pay与高管激励.pdf

Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives Author(s): Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy Source: The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 2 (Apr., 1990), pp. 225-264 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: /stable/2937665 Accessed: 15/10/2009 14:02 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use, available at /page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at /action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@. The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Political Economy. Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives Michael C. Jensen Harvard University KevinJ. Murphy Universityof Rochester Our estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, op- tions, stockholdings, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indi- cate that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Although the incentives generated