《《Graham - 1999 - Herding among Investment Newsletters Theory and E》.pdf

American Finance Association Herding among Investment Newsletters: Theory and Evidence Author(s): John R. Graham Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Feb., 1999), pp. 237-268 Published by: Wiley for the American Finance Association Stable URL: /stable/222415 . Accessed: 24/01/2013 15:55 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use, available at . /page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@. . Wiley and American Finance Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Finance. This content downloaded on Thu, 24 Jan 2013 15:55:57 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE * VOL. LIV, NO. 1 * FEBRUARY 1999 Herding among Investment Newsletters: Theory and Evidence JOHN R. GRAHAM* ABSTRACT A model is developed which implies that if an analyst has high reputation or low ability, or if there is strong public information that is inconsistent with the ana- lysts private information, she is likely to herd. Herding is also common when informative private signals are positively correlated across analysts. The model is tested using data from analysts who publish investment newsletters. Consistent with