《中国和印度地下金融.》.pdfVIP

World DevelopmentVol. 32, No. 9, pp. 1487–1507, 2004 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain /locate/worlddev 0305-750X/$ - see front matter doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.06.001 Imperfect Substitutes: The Local Political Economy of Informal Finance and Microfinance in Rural China and India KELLEE S. TSAI * Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA Available online Summary. — Banking authorities in both China and India have attempted to limit most forms of informal finance by regulating them, banning them, and allowing certain types of microfinance institutions. The latter policy aims to increase the availability of credit to low-income entrepreneurs and eliminate their reliance on usurious financing. Nonetheless, the intended clients of microfinance continue to draw on informal finance in both rural China and India. This article argues that the persistence of informal finance may be traced to four complementary reasons––the limited supply of formal credit, limits in state capacity to implement its policies, the political and economic segmentation of local markets, and the institutional weaknesses of many microfinance programs. 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Key words — Asia, China, India, informal finance, microfinance, rural finance ‘‘[O]fficial reports of the moneylender’s impending de- well-located rural households that have the mise ar