Ch11货币金融学 米什金 第七版.pdf

chapter 11 Economic Analysis of Banking Regulation In this chapter, we develop an economic analysis of why regulation of banking takes the form it does. Unfortunately, the regulatory process may not always work very well, as evidenced by recent crises in the banking systems, not only in the United States but in many countries throughout the world. We also use our economic analysis of banking regulation to explain the worldwide crises in banking and how the regulatory system can be reformed to prevent future disasters. §1.Asymmetric Information and Bank Regulation Government Safety Net ：Deposit Insurance （政府安 全网：存款保险） Restrictions on Asset Holdings （对持有资产的限制） Bank Capital Requirements （银行资本金要求） Bank Supervision: Chartering and Examination （银 行监管：注册与检查） Assessment of risk management （风险管理评估） Disclosure Requirements （信息披露要求） Consumer Protection （消费者保护） Restrictions on competition （对竞争的限制） 1 .Government Safety Net and Deposit Insurance A. Prevents bank runs due to asymmetric information: depositors can’t tell good from bad banks Two reasons why the banking system might not function well: (A) bank failure(银行破产）⇒depositors would be reluctant to put money in the bank ⇒bank less viable (B) depositors’ lack of information about the quality of bank asset ⇒bank panics （银行恐慌） Two methods to handle a failed bank: payoff(偿付法) ;purchase and assumption （购买和接管法） B. Creates moral hazard incentives for banks to take on too much risk C. Creates adverse selection problem of crooks and risk-takers wanting to control banks D. “Too Big to Fail” (银行太大不能倒闭)increases moral hazard incentives for big banks 2. Restrictions on Asset Holdings （对持有资产的 限制） A.