EU enlargement towards strongcartelstrong paradise An Economic Analysis.pdf

Erasmus Law and Economics Review 1 (February 2004): 77–109. EU ENLARGEMENT TOWARDS CARTEL PARADISE? AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE REFORM OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW * Marc Pirrung Abstract In this paper the reform process of European procedural competition law shall be analyzed from a law and economics perspective, starting with the famous Regulation 17 and ending with Regulation 1/2003 which will enter into force in May 2004 (and will be immediately applicable in the new Member States). The focus lies on the system switch from a centralized authorization system to a system of decentralized ex post control with a broader scope for private court actions. It will be analyzed in how far the system switch affects overall efficiency. Finally, it shall be examined in how far specific provisions of Regulation 1/2003 can contribute to enhancing the efficiency of the procedural law. Keywords : Regulation 17/62, Regulation 1/2003, Reform of EU competition law, Optimal law enforcement, Notification system, Legal exception system, EU cartel policy. JEL classification : K21, K42, L40. * The author is member of the editorial board of the Erasmus Law Economics Review. For personal and contact information see . This paper is based on his LL.M. thesis submitted in July 2003. The author is indebted to Dennis Khong for reviewing the article and providing numerous very helpful comments. Any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the author. All views expressed herein are strictly personal and are in no way connected to any organization the author is or has been associated with. © 2004 Marc Pirrung. Subject to ELER Public License 1.0. URL: http://www.eler.og