中国上市公司高管激励与盈余管理的动态内生性关系研究重点解读.doc

中国上市公司高管激励与盈余管理的动态内生性关系研究 —以制造业为例 侯剑平1 1 （1.西安工业大学 经济管理学院，陕西 西安 710032） 摘要：高管激励是解决委托—代理问题的重要公司治理机制之一，也是产生盈余管理动机的原因之一。为了研究高管激励与盈余管理的关系，本文选取2007~2011年中国制造业上市公司面板数据，基于动态内生性视角，采用广义矩GMM（Generalized Method of Moments）估计模型，对高管激励与盈余管理的相关性进行实证研究，结果发现（1）当期高管激励与当期盈余管理之间并无显著相关关系；（2）前期盈余管理与当期高管激励之间存在显著的正相关关系；（3）前期高管激励对当期盈余管理的影响只体现在高管薪酬激励方面，高管股权激励方面并不显著；（4）高管激励存在跨期影响，即前期的高管激励水平与当期高管激励水平之间存在显著的正相关关系，而盈余管理不存在这种现象。 关键词：薪酬激励；股权激励；盈余管理；动态内生性 中图分类号： 文献标识码： 文章编号： Study on the Dynamic Endogenous Relationship between Executive Incentive and Earnings Management with Chinese Listed Companies 桿se Manufacturing Industry as an Example HOU iJianping1 HUI Rongrong1 (1.School of Economics Management Xi’an Technological University, Xi’an, 710032) Abstract: The executive incentive is one of the important governance mechanisms to solve the problem of “Principal-Agent”, but also may be one of the reasons of earnings management motivation. In order to study the relationship between executive incentive and earnings management, this paper selects Chinese listed company of manufacturing industry from 2007 to 2011 panel data, using GMM(Generalized Method of Moments) estimation model, makes an empirical study on the relationship between executive incentive and earnings management, the results show that:(1)There is no significant correlativity between current executive incentive and current earnings management;(2)There is a significant positive correlativity between past earnings management and current executive incentive;(3)Past executive incentive effect on current earnings management only reflected in executive compensation incentive, the executive equity incentive aspect is not significant;(4)There are intertemporal effects of executive incentive, it means that there were significantly positive correlation between past executive incentive and current executive incentive, but there is no such phenomenon in earnings management. Key words: compensation incentive; equity incentive; earni