当有交易成本时财产权的归属会影响到资源的有效运用课件.pptVIP

当有交易成本时财产权的归属会影响到资源的有效运用课件.ppt

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The time-honored and fundamental question: Why should there be any property rights in things? In what respects does the protection of property right promote social welfare? What is going to happen without property right? Coase(1962): Nothing, in the perspective of social efficiency, if there are transaction costs Ex: cow and railroad, factory and nearby residents, females in the males dorm The (Coase)Therom Posner :if transactions are costless, the initial assignment of a property right will not affect the ultimate use of the property. Levitt: the initial allocation of legal entitlements does not matter from an efficiency perspective as long as they can be exchanged and transaction costs are low enough. Becker: but it does affect distribution! income effect: efficiency will be changed in a GE view. When do property rights matter? No transaction cost→ property right does not matter Property right matter →transaction cost In general, we assume that we have higher probability to find the situation where Coase thm does not apply if there are transaction costs. IF Coase Thm fails to explain the real world almost everywhere, that means PR is important... 當有交易成本時財產權的歸屬會影響到資源的有效運用 因此 選擇財產權(or legal rules) 的標準: Minimize the effect of transaction cost Ex 若居民有空氣權 工廠找居民 漫天要價 若工廠有空氣權 居民找工廠 抗爭黑道 Transaction cost comes from (1)Number of participants: Olson and Dixit(J of Public Economics, 2000 pp309-335) In a public good game, (2)Cost of bargaining and enforcement (3)Identifying parties to bargain是誰排氣? (4)Strategic behavior: Bilateral monopoly ex 只有夫妻兩人 Asymmetric info Hold up ex共有土地一人一票 (4)Information Hoffman and Spitzer J Law and Economics (1982) 1st experiment: common info 2nd experiment:private info (only know own payoff 1st prediction: gets PO 2nd prediction: property right owner gets the surplus Result: prediction 1 prediction 2 1st exp 23/24 7/24 2nd exp 19/24 6/24 (5)Culture:

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