金融危机5周年金融危机5周年.doc

Monetary policy after the crash Controlling interest 货币政策调控利率The third of our series of articles on the financial crisis looks at the unconventional methods central bankers have adopted to stimulate growth in its wake本文重点检讨央行官员在危机初期为刺激增长而采取的非常规性政策 1 BEFORE the financial crisis life was simple for central bankers. They had a clear mission: temper booms and busts to maintain low and stable inflation. And they had a seemingly effective means to achieve that: nudge a key short-term interest rate up to discourage borrowing (and thus check inflation), or down to foster looser credit (and thus spur growth and employment). Deft use of this technique had kept the world humming along so smoothly in the decades before the crash that economists had declared a “Great Moderation” in the economic cycle. As it turned out, however, the moderation was transitory—and the crash that ended it undermined not only the central bankers record but also the method they relied on to prop up growth. Monetary policy has been in a state of upheaval ever since. 金融危机前，央行官员们过着一种简单的生活，他们的任务非常明确。那就是，调和经济的起起落落，将通胀保持在一个稳定的低水平。同时，他们手中还具备一个看上去有效的工具来完成这个任务，即调高关键的短期利率以打击借贷，控制通胀；或者是下调利率以培育宽松的信贷，刺激增长和就业。对这种技术的熟练运用曾让整个世界在危机前的数十年中平缓地向前推进，以至于经济学家们宣称，那段时期是经济周期的“大缓和”阶段。不过，局势的发展业已证明，所谓的“大缓和”不过是暂时的罢了。终结那场“大缓和”的危机不仅让央行官员的“功劳簿”多出一个不光彩的纪录，而且还对他们赖以推动增长的方式造成了打击。从那以后，货币政策就处于一种不稳定的状态之中。 2 The recession that accompanied the credit crunch in the autumn of 2008 delivered a massive blow to demand. In response central banks in the rich world slashed their benchmark interest rates. By early 2009 many were close to zero, approaching what economists call the “zero lower bound”. Even so, growth remained elusive. Pushing rates below zero, though technically possible, would not have helped. Negative rates would merely have encouraged depositors to withdraw their money from banks and hold it as cash, on which the rate of return, at zero, would have been higher. Central banks in the developed ec