毕业设计论文-独立审计舞弊的博弈分析及对策研究.doc

郑州大学西亚斯国际学院 本科毕业论文 题 目 独立审计舞弊的博弈分析及对策研究 指导教师 闫贝贝 职称 讲师 学生姓名 李烜 学号 20111223330 专 业 审计学 班级 审计三班 院 （系） 商学院会计系 完成时间 2015年4月16日 独立审计舞弊的博弈分析及对策研究 摘 要 在当今市场经济的大环境下，实施独立审计的机构为了获取更多的利益报酬，在审计工作中选择舞弊的现象已经屡见不鲜。独立审计工作作为审计监督体系的重要组成部分如果出现舞弊，将会给与被审计单位有关联的利益相关方，即投资者，债权人，财务报表使用者，监管部门等造成巨大的损失，并给注册会计师这一行业的信誉造成巨大的负面影响，对诚信执业的会计师事务所带来不利的竞争压力和信任危机。本文将运用博弈论作为理论基础，建立博弈模型，分析舞弊存在的相关方之间的博弈行为，就如何有效的避免审计工作中预将会出现的舞弊，提出针对性的对策，为独立审计行业治理舞弊现象提供理论参考。 关键词 独立审计； 舞弊； 博弈论 Game Analysis and Countermeasures Independent Audit Fraud ABSTRACT In todays market economy, the environment, the implementation of an independent audit of the agency in order to obtain more benefits paid, select fraud in audit work has been common phenomenon. Independent audit as an important part of the audit oversight system if there is fraud, it will cause huge losses to give the audited entity associated stakeholders, namely investors, creditors, users of financial statements, and other regulatory authorities, and to CPA reputation in the industry caused a huge negative impact on the integrity of the accounting firm practicing adverse competitive pressures and a crisis of confidence. This article will use game theory as the theoretical basis for the establishment of game model to analyze the behavior of fraud exist in the game between the relevant parties on how to effectively avoid fraud in the pre-audit work will be put forward specific measures, namely the implementation of an independent audit Analysis and Countermeasure among agencies and regulatory bodies, and countermeasures implemented independent auditor and the audited entity and implementation between Analysis and Countermeasure between independent auditors provide a theoretical reference for the independent audit industry control fraud. KEY WORDS Independent Audit, Fraud, Game Theory 目 录 中文摘要 I 英文摘要 II 1 绪论 1 1.1研究背景 1 1.