A6 Discretionary disclosure in the presence of dual distribution channels全权披露的双重存在供参习.docVIP

Discretionary disclosure in the presence of dual distribution channels全权披露的双重存在 分销渠道 A prevailing view in the disclosure literature is that firms who learn favorable market information are reluctant to disclose it, fearing it will attract new rivals. In this paper, we demonstrate that the presence of dual distribution arrangements, wherein consumers can purchase products either from traditional retail firms or directly from suppliers, can notably alter disclosure incentives. As under prevailing views, a retailer disclosing positive news risks entry by competitors. However, entry shifts the incumbent supplier–retailer relationship: the presence of new competitors leads the supplier to treat its retailer more as a strategic partner, translating into lower wholesale prices. This, in turn, can lead the retailer to willingly share favorable news, since such disclosure invites entry precisely when the retailer stands to benefit most from price concessions. Our results suggest that as dual distribution continues to increase in prominence, firms may be more willing to voluntarily disclose sensitive financial information particularly that which points to high demand for its products. 在公开文献中的一个普遍的看法是，企业谁学习有利的市场信息都不愿意透露，担心它会吸引新的竞争者。在本文中，我们证明了双分销安排，其中，消费者可以购买的产品无论是从传统的零售企业，或直接从供应商的存在，能显着改变披露的激励机制。由于根据当时的看法，零售商透露利好消息的风险由竞争者进入市场。然而，进入移动现任供应商 - 零售商关系：新的竞争对手的存在导致供应商对待它的零售商更作为战略合作伙伴，转化为较低的批发价格。这反过来，可能导致零售商心甘情愿地分享利好消息，因为这样的披露邀请进入恰恰当零售商表示，从价格优惠中受益最多。我们的研究结果表明，作为双重分布继续增加突出，企业可能更愿意自愿披露特别是指向其产品的高需求敏感的财务信息。 1. Introduction Firms are typically eager to disclose favorable financial performance to capital markets. However, concern that information will have harmful competitive consequences can restrain disclosures. This issue is particularly pressing for retail firms operating in a competitive marketplace. Though frequent interactions with customers may enable retailers to gather information about demand conditions, their financial disclosures are often not revealing about sales of individua