Playing_for_Real8.ppt

Repeating a Zero-Sum Game Repeating a Zero-Sum Game Repeating a Zero-Sum Game Repeating a Zero-Sum Game Repeating a Zero-Sum Game Repeating a Zero-Sum Game Repeating a Zero-Sum Game Repeating a Zero-Sum Game Repeating the Prisoners’ Dilemma Repeating the Prisoners’ Dilemma Repeating the Prisoners’ Dilemma Repeating the Prisoners’ Dilemma Repeating the Prisoners’ Dilemma Repeating the Prisoners’ Dilemma Repeating the Prisoners’ Dilemma Collusion in a RepeatedCournot Duopoly Collusion in a RepeatedCournot Duopoly Collusion in a RepeatedCournot Duopoly Collusion in a RepeatedCournot Duopoly Collusion in a RepeatedCournot Duopoly Collusion in a RepeatedCournot Duopoly Nice Finite Automata Nasty Finite Automata Computer wars Patient players Patient players Patient players Patient players Folk theorem Folk theorem Folk theorem Folk theorem Folk theorem Folk theorem Folk theorem Folk theorem Folk theorem Folk theorem Folk theorem Folk theorem Folk theorem Folk theorem Folk theorem Folk theorem Folk theorem Folk theorem Folk theorem Social contract Social contract as an equilibrium in a repeated game David Hume Reductive? Experiment with apes Trust, authority, altruism? Social contract Social contract Social contract Social contract dove dove hawk hawk 2 -1 3 0 2 -1 3 0 Prisoners’ Dilemma 0 3 2 -1 -1 2 3 0 3 2 -1 -1 2 3 set of Nashequilibriumoutcomes inrepeated game dove dove hawk hawk 2 -1 3 0 2 -1 3 0 Prisoners’ Dilemma 0 3 2 -1 -1 2 3 0 3 2 -1 -1 2 3 y (2,2) (-1,3) after a deviation h d d d d h h d d h h d d h d h d h d h Adam plays HUMPTY Eve plays DUMPTY h d d d d h h d d h h d d h d h d h d h Adam plays HUMPTY Eve plays DUMPTY What is theworst punishment? 0 1 0 9 4 6 1 0 3 2 7 3 0 0 3 2 2 4 s1 s2 s3 t1 t2 t3 (0,2) (1,0) (0,9) (3,7) (6,4) (4,0) (2,3) (3,0) (2,1) (0,2) (1,0) (0,9) (3,7) (6,4) (4,0) (3,0) (0,2) (1,0) (0,9) (3,7) (6,4) (4,0) (3,0) 0 1 0 9 4 6 1 0 3 2 7 3 0 0 3 2 2 4 s1 s2 s3 t1 t2 t3 (0,2) (0,2) (0,2) (2,3) (2,1) 0 1 0 9 4 6 1 0 3 2 7