我a国上市公司高管持股情况与公司绩效的实证研究.doc

我国上市公司高管持股情况与公司绩效的实证研究 The Empirical Research of Relations between Manager Holdings and Corporate Performance within Chinese Listed Company 摘要 委托代理问题，即经营者激励与约束问题是公司治理研究的一个重点问题。股权激励于上世纪80年代在西方企业广泛实施，在解决委托代理问题上取得了极大的成功。而目前股权激励机制在我国面临着与西方不同的企业经营环境和条件，面临着不同的市场发展阶段，如何在国内合理应用这一先进的公司治理理论，其实施究竟是否要作相应的调整，是否能产生正面的效果，仍需要实证检验。本文系统回顾了国内外关于公司高管持股情况与公司绩效的研究，并以上海和深圳证券交易所的744家上市公司为研究样本，对我国上市公司高管持股情况与公司绩效的相互关系分别使用一次模型和三次模型进行实证研究。研究发现，当高管持股比例相对较低和相对较高时，高管持股比例与公司绩效呈负相关关系，只有在中间一个合适的范围内，两者才呈正相关关系。该结果理论上的解释就是高管持股比例在较低水平时，其增加所带来的利益趋同产生的正效应小于控制权分散所产生的负效应；当这个比例增加到适中的水平时，正效应增大到大于控制权分散导致的负效应，使两变量呈正相关；当该比例较大，使管理层成为控股人时，又违背了公司制经营权和所有权分离的初衷，导致效率低下，两变量再次呈负相关。最后，总结归纳我国上市公司股权激励机制的现状与问题，并提出相应的实施建议。 关键词：公司治理; 高管持股; 股权激励；公司绩效 Abstract The agent problem, namely the manager inspiration and monitor problem, is a very important one in the research of company governs. The stock inspiration has been widely practiced in the western company since the 80th of the last Century, and it has achieved great success in solving the agent problem. But our country has different business circumstance and condition for the stock incentive mechanism, and we’re in different develop stage, so how to apply this advanced corporation govern theory, and whether its application needs adjustment and whether it will generate positive effects are still problems under empirical examination. This article systematically reviewed both domestic and foreign relative research about the relationship between manager holding and corporation performance, and take the 744 companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges as the sample to empirically find the relationship between manager holding and corporation performance of the listed company in our country. At last, concluding the current state and problems of the listed company in our country, and putting forward the corresponding implementation proposal. Key words：Corporation Governs; Manager Holding; Stock Inspiration; Corporation Per