VOTING AS A RATIONAL CHOICE WHY AND HOW PEOPLE VOTE TO IMPROVE THE WELL-BEING OF OTHERS.pdf

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VOTING AS A RATIONAL CHOICE WHY AND HOW PEOPLE VOTE TO IMPROVE THE WELL-BEING OF OTHERS.pdf

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VOTING AS A RATIONAL CHOICE WHY AND HOW PEOPLE VOTE TO IMPROVE THE WELL-BEING OF OTHERS

Society Rationality and DOI: 10.1177/1043463107077384 2007; 19; 293 Rationality and Society Aaron Edlin, Andrew Gelman and Noah Kaplan Improve the Well-Being of Others Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote To /cgi/content/abstract/19/3/293 The online version of this article can be found at: Published by: can be found at:Rationality and Society Additional services and information for /cgi/alerts Email Alerts: /subscriptions Subscriptions: /journalsReprints.navReprints: /journalsPermissions.navPermissions: /cgi/content/refs/19/3/293 SAGE Journals Online and HighWire Press platforms): (this article cites 36 articles hosted on the Citations distribution. ? 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized at CALIFORNIA DIGITAL LIBRARY on September 17, 2007 Downloaded from VOTING AS A RATIONAL CHOICE WHY AND HOW PEOPLE VOTE TO IMPROVE THE WELL-BEING OF OTHERS Aaron Edlin, Andrew Gelman, and Noah Kaplan ABSTRACT For voters with ‘social’ preferences, the expected utility of voting is approximately independent of the size of the electorate, suggesting that rational voter turnouts can be substantial even in large elections. Less important elections are predicted to have lower turnout, but a feedback mechanism keeps turnout at a reasonable level under a wide range of conditions. The main contributions of this paper are: (1) to show how, for an individual with both selfish and social preferences, the social prefer- ences will dominate and make it rational for a typical person to vote even in large elections; (2) to show that rational socially motivated voting has a feedback mechanism that stabilizes turnout at reasonable levels (e.g., 50% of the electorate); (3) to link the rational social-utility model of voter turnout with survey findings on socially motivated vote choice. KEY WORDS ? elections ? turnout ? sociotropic voting ? rational choice 1. Introduction We demonstrate that voting is rational even