代理理论在国际化管理中的运用.pdf

Journal of Management Studies 48:2 March 2011 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00921.x Agency Perspectives on Corporate Governance of Multinational Enterprisesjoms_921 471..486 Igor Filatotchev and Mike Wright Cass Business School; Nottingham University Business School abstract This paper argues for a greater focus on an agency theory (AT) perspective in understanding corporate governance in multinational enterprises (MNEs) since, despite recent developments, the traditional internalization theory approach limits our understanding of the behaviour of these ?rms. We analyse the contribution of an AT perspective to understanding various aspects of corporate governance in MNEs: internationalization, international joint ventures (IJVs), headquarters–subsidiary relationships, and new forms of global business groups. From this analysis, we suggest that even with the emerging AT literature’s focus on the role of ownership as a key governance factor, there is substantial need for research on several key corporate governance mechanisms; namely, the role and nature of dominant owners, the composition of boards of directors, the separation of CEOs and board chairs, executive remuneration, and the role of the market for corporate control. There is scope to examine further the implications of different institutional environments for AT perspectives on the behaviour of MNEs. INTRODUCTION The last decade has witnessed an explosion in both policy and research devoted to the corporate governance of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Following these recent devel- opments, Buckley and Strange (2010) argue that to the extent that the international business (IB) literature has focused on governance issues, the emphasis has been on the bureaucratic control of the allocation of production and distribution systems, generally from an internalization theory (IT) perspective. Even so, there is a need to extend our understanding of governance issues in MNEs to embrace strategy a