EPR制度下废弃电子产品回收的低碳研发激励机制研究.PDF

第 32卷 第 4期 控 制 与 决 策 Vol.32 No.4 2017年 4月 Control and Decision Apr. 2017 文章编号: 1001-0920(2017)04-0656-09 DOI: 10.13195/j.kzyjc.2016.0339 EPR制度下废弃电子产品回收的低碳研发激励机制研究 刘克宁1,2, 宋华明1 ? (1. 南京理工大学 经济管理学院，南京 210094；2. 鲁东大学 交通学院，山东 烟台 264025) 摘 要: 在由生产者与研发方组成的两阶段闭环供应链体系中,考察生产者延伸责任制(EPR)对产品低碳研发设 计的激励作用以及对废弃电子产品回收的减排效果. 以生产商为Stackelberg博弈领导者,设计预先承诺收益分配 比例的 S-S 模型和延迟承诺 S-N 模型, 并给出两种模型的最优契约决策. 研究发现, 研发方的低碳研发技术水平、 碳税税率、双方在回收减排中的重要度都会对契约决策和回收减排产生影响, 在系数满足一定条件下, 两种模型 的回收减排效果各有优势. 关键词: 生产者延伸责任制；废弃电子产品回收；低碳研发；Stackelberg博弈；激励契约 中图分类号: F273；F224 文献标志码: A Low-carbon RD incentive mechanism based on EPR system for E-waste product recycling LIU Ke-ning1,2, SONG Hua-ming1 ? (1. School of Economics and Management，Nanjing University of Science and Technology，Nanjing 210094，China； 2. School of Transportation，Ludong University，Yantai 264025，China) Abstract: In the two-stage closed-loop supply chain system between the producer and the RD supplier, this paper investigates the incentive e?ects to green RD designing and the carbon emission reduction by implementing extended producer responsibility(EPR). As the leader of the Stackelberg game, the producer develops two kinds of RD cooperative contracts to the researcher: The S-S model gives a revenue sharing ratio at the beginning of RD stage, and the S-N model gives the ratio after observing the real carbon emission of component. And the optimal solutions of each model are given. It is found that, the contract decisions and recycling carbon emissions are a?ected by the low-carbon RD technology, the