我国高管薪酬粘性研究文献综述.pdfVIP

2017年2月 中国林业经济 Feb.2017 第1期(总第142期) CHINA FORESTRYECONOMICS No.1(Total 142) 研究报告 我国高管薪酬粘性研究文献综述 汤盼盼，宋良荣 （上海理工大学 管理学院，上海 200093） 摘 要：高管薪酬粘性的存在会弱化高管薪酬的激励效果，制定合理的高管薪酬激励机制一直是解决企业组织中所有 权与经营权相互分离问题的重要举措。主要对关于高管薪酬粘性的研究及相关实证检验进行系统的整理，关注高管薪酬与 企业绩效的关系、高管薪酬粘性存在性检验以及公司治理方面与薪酬粘性的相关实证分析。通过总结相关研究不足，试图 找寻未来可能存在的研究方向，提出了合理制定公司薪酬激励制度的建议。 关键词：高管薪酬；薪酬粘性；企业绩效 中图分类号：F244.1 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1673-5919（2017）01-0091-04 DOI：10.13691/j.cnki.cn23-1539/f.2017.01.026 ReviewonExecutiveCompensationStickinessinChina TANGPan-pan,SONGliang-rong (CollegeofManagement,UniversityofShanghaiforScienceandTechnology,Shanghai200093，China) Abstract: Executive compensation stick will weaken the incentive effects of executive compensation, reasonable executive compensation incentive mechanism has been an important measure to solve the question of separation between ownership and management of enterprise organization. In this paper, systematic studieson executive compensation stick andrelated empirical analysis of corporate governance and related empirical test, focus on the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance, empirical analysis of the existence of executive compensation stickiness and corporate governance. By summing up the relevant research deficiencies, try to find the possible future research directionsandputforwardtherecommendationthatmakereasonablethecompensationincentivesystem. Keywords:ExecutiveCompensation;PayStickiness;EnterprisePerformance 1 薪酬粘性的定义及研究意义 与企业绩效不符等现象的日益加剧，薪酬问题逐渐 1.1 薪酬粘性的定义