经营者信誉资本与会计契约履行的博弈分析.pdfVIP

Vo l. 7.No. 3 第 7 卷第 3 期 商商农业大学学报(社会科学版) Journa! of Southwest Agricultural University( Socia! Science Edition) Jun.2009 2009 年 6 月 经营者信誉资本与会计契约履行的博弈分析 意杰成1 ，刘建秋2 (1.湖南科技大学商学院，湖南湘潭 411201 ;2. 湖南商学院会计学院，湖南长沙 410205) 编 襄:会计集约的缔约::È体包指企业经倚着和具有其它倍息需求的利益相关翁，由于契约的不完全性及双方不可避免的利益冲 突，企业经营者和利益相关者之间就会计契约的履行进行着博弈.经营者倩誉资本的存在给经营者带来了iìTJl俏的惩罚空间，因 而使得会计契约能够有效地履行. 关键诩t 倚脊资本$会计契约8 博弈 :lt.编号 :1672 耐 5379(2009)03 -0041-04 中回分类号:F230 文献串串诙码:A Game Analysis of Manager s Reputation Capital and Performance of Accounting Contracts 丁ONG Jie-cheng1 • LIU Jian-qiu2 (1. Business College , Hunan University of Science and Technology , Xiangtan , Hunan 411201 , China; 2. School of Accounting , H unan U niversity of Commerce. Changsha , H unan 410205 , China) Abstract:The contractors of an accounting contract include enterprise managers and other stakeholders. As a result of incom- plete contracts and the unavoidable interest conflict. the managers and the stakeholders always game on the implementation of accounting contracts. The tnanagers reputation capital works as the incredible punishment space , which makes it possible to effectively implement the accounting contract. Key words:reputation capital; accounting contract; game 为信息需求者的契约3:体观察到会计执行者存在;清 一、倍曾与会计提约履行 约行为时，即对会ìt规则执行者施加一种私人惩罚， 这与法院强制实施正好相反。肘子会计规则执行者 对于会计俯息的质量缺陷问题，只要是会计规 而富，违约有关的私人惩罚吏腰包括未来人力资本 则执行者主观有意对会计规则的违背，最终都表现