管理者代理行为、公司过度投资及公司治理.pdf

管理者代理行为、公司过度投资与公司治理 ——基于企业生命周期视角的实证研究 李云鹤 1 李湛 2 （1:华东师范大学 金融与统计学院 上海 200241; 2:上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院，上海，200052 ） 摘要：通过构建企业生命周期新的划分指标，从企业发展进程的动态层面考察管理者代理行为与 公司过度投资之间关系随企业生命周期的演变，并检验公司治理机制随企业生命周期的治理效果。结 果表明，我国上市公司管理者代理行为随企业生命周期动态变化，其对公司过度投资的影响随企业生 命周期发展不断减弱。不同公司治理机制的治理效果随企业生命周期也发生变化，其中董事长总经理 兼任在成长阶段能够有效减弱公司过度投资，而独立董事在成熟阶段及大股东在衰退阶段均显著没有 发挥应有的监督作用。成长阶段中的公司监事会能够对代理行为引致的过度投资起到显著的监督作用， 而董事长总经理兼任则显著加剧代理行为引致的过度投资，成长阶段中管理层持股、成熟阶段中独立 董事与外部机构持股以及衰退阶段中大股东均显著没有起到应有的治理作用。 关键词：公司过度投资，管理者代理行为，公司治理，企业生命周期 中图分类号: F275 文献标示码: A Managerial Agency Behavior, Corporate Over-investment and Corporate Governance ：Empirical Study from A Perspective of Firm Lifecycle Abstract: This paper breaks out the traditional methods and has a research on over-investment from dynamic perspective by designing a new index of corporate lifecycle, moreover; it examined the effectiveness of corporate governance with corporate lifecycle. The findings indicate that managerial agency was evolved with corporate life-cycle, and its effects on the degree of over-investment are decreasing with the development from growing stage to declining stage. Besides, the corporate governances are also changing with corporate lifecycle, among them; the board duality could effectively weaken corporate over-investment, while board independence at the stage of maturity and large stock holders at the stage of decline could not monitor effectively. The committee of supervisors at the stage of growth could not effectively monitor corporate over-investment induced by managerial agency, while board duality exaggerates corporate over-investment, but managerial stock holdings at the stage growth, board independence and outer institution stock holdings at the stage of maturity and large stock holder h