离散条件下对称协调博弈随机稳定性研究.doc

PAGE PAGE 11 离散条件下对称协调博弈随机稳定性研究本项目得到广东省自然科学基金支持，项目号 本项目得到广东省自然科学基金支持，项目号 张良桥 作者简介：张良桥，男，1968年11月生，湖南祁阳人，经济学副教授，中山大学岭南学院04级博士研究生，研究方向：经济模型博弈论与信息经济学，联系方式：zlbridge@163.com。 中山大学岭南学院04博，广东 广州 Lingnan college zhongshan University, Guangzhou 摘要：许多学者研究过离散条件下对称协调博弈的随机稳定性，但他们的研究要么缺乏实用性、要么脱离现实，大大降低了模型的可用性。结合社会学、心理学等研究成果及已有研究的基础，提出了新模型来系统地研究离散条件下对称协调博弈的随机稳定性，新模型增加了可操作性与实用性，便于分析演化中间状态与逆转成本的具体数量关系，能够更加容易地解释现实中许多现象。 关键词：对称协调博弈；随机稳定状态；逆转成本；演化时间 On the stochastic stability of symmetry coordination game under discrete state Abstract：Many researchers have done researches on stochastic stability of the symmetric coordination game under the discrete condition. However, given to the lack of the practicability and reality, the usability of the model suggested in these former researches have been greatly reduced. Integrating the research findings in the field of sociology and psychology and the former research foundation, the paper presents a new with aims to systematically analyze stochastic stability of symmetric coordination game (2x2) under the divergence condition. With increased maneuverability and practicability, the model is convenient for analyzing and formulating the specific quantitative relation between state and adverse cost. It can also assist to explain many phenomena in reality in an easier way. Key words: symmetry coordination game; stochastic stable state; adverse cost; evolutionary time 引言 均衡选择问题是令博弈论理论家苦恼但又必须面对的问题，非合作博弈理论在处理多重纳什均衡（Nash 1951）[1]特别是协调博弈中严格纳什均衡之间的选择问题时，碰到了难以克服的困难，正如Ken Binmore在Weibull(1995)[2]进化博弈理论一书的序言中指出：“However different game theorists proposed so many different rationality definitions the available set of refinements of Nash equilibrium became embarrassingly large, Eventually almost any Nash equilibrium could be justified in terms of someone or others refinement”；也如Larry Samuelson(1993)[3]所说的“Different refinements yield different predictions, transforming the problem of multiple equilibrium into a problem of multiple refin