Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity-英文文献.pdf

Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 14–23 Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity Douglas W. Diamond Philip H. Dybvig Theodore O. Yntema Professor Boatmen’s Bancshares Professor of Finance of Banking and Finance Graduate School of Business John M. Olin School of Business University of Chicago Washington University in St. Louis Abstract This article develops a model which shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks which lead to a demand for liquidity. Traditional demand deposit contracts which provide liquidity have multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs in the model cause real economic damage, rather than simply reflecting other problems. Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis shows that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts. This article is reprinted from the Journal of Political Economy (June 1983, vol. 91, no. 3, pp. 401–19) with the permission of the University of Chicago Press. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. This article develops a model which shows that bank deposit namely, suspension of convertibility and demand deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange insurance (which works similarly to a central bank serving markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs as lender of last resort). can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks The illiquidity o