托马斯A普格尔《国际金融》研究.ppt

between the interest income on the lending capital (at the equilibrium MPK) and the production of such capital in the absence of international lending; the capital-constraint nation will get the difference between the total production of the lending capital and the interest expense on the lending capital (at the equilibrium MPK) Within each nation, there are gainers and losers from international lending: lenders gain and borrowers lose in capital-abundant nation, whereas borrowers lose and lenders gain in capital-constraint nation * In addition, capital lending by capital-abundant nation will lower its productivity and earnings of other resources, whereas capital borrowing by capital-constraint nation will raise its productivity and earnings of other resources If taxes are added to the model, the total production of the world will be less. One nation gains at the expense of the other nation and the world as a whole, or both nation lose * International lending to developing countries The surge in international lending (1974-1982) The debt crisis of 1982 The resurgence of capital flows in the 1990s The Mexican Crisis, 1994-1995 The Asian Crisis, 1997 The Russian Crisis, 1998 The Brazilian Crisis, 1999 The Turkish Crisis, 2001 Argentinas Crisis, 2001-2002 * Financial crises: What can and does go wrong Waves of overlending and over borrowing Exogenous international shocks Exchange rate risk Fickle international short-term lending Global contagion * Resolving financial crises Rescue packages The purposes of the rescue packages Main problem with rescue packages: moral hazard Debt restructuring Debt rescheduling Debt reduction Main problem with debt restructuring: no-cooperative game * Reducing the frequency of financial crises Bank regulation and supervision Capital control * The ongoing financial crunch (2007- ) Some backgrounds The previous crises in emerging markets The burst of the internet bubble Subprime mortgage loans and securitization The subprime mortgage