祛痘从调理身体开始.ppt

A Protection Architecture for Enterprise Networks(and comments on security-centric network design) Martin Casado (Stanford) Tal Garfinkel (Stanford) Aditya Akella (CMU/Stanford) Michael Freedman (NYU) Dan Boneh (Stanford) Nick McKeown (Stanford) Scott Shenker (ICSI/Berkeley) What I’m Going to Talk About A lot about security in the Enterprise A little bit about security on the Internet Generally exploit this opportunity to pontificate Remember .. this is Clean Slate Maybe a little “out-there” Maybe a little “wrong” Supposed to foment ideas and discussion(so please interrupt me) Public vs. Private Networks Public (google, ebay, etc.) Get as wide exposure (mostly) everyone welcome Want some protection from evil-doers Private (internal commercial, financial etc.) Special purpose Limited user base Knows what’s running where Fundamentally different(but use same technologies) Infrastructure Support for Public Services Infrastructure Support for Private Networks Supported by IP Motivation Punch Line Defining Connectivity Defining Connectivity (the bad) Control Over Routing Centralized Trust and Control Restrict Access to Information Retrofitting Security onto IP Designed for Security Firewalls, Router ACLS Port Security IDS/NDS/IPS (scan detection, anomaly detection, signature detection) VLANs Pushed Into Service Ethernet Switches NATs, Proxies Argument Thus Far Enterprise networks use IP (design for Internet) IP not designed for attack resistance permissive Unauthenticated end-points No knowledge of application protocols Heavily distributed (proliferation of TCB) No support for ubiquitous logging Attempts to retrofit access controls have resulted in less-than-ideal networks Confusing Brittle Etc. Lets Start from Scratch Leverage characteristics unique to Enterprise Centrally managed Known users Structured connectivity Reduce number of trusted components Simplify policy declaration Retain flexibili