公平偏好与薪酬激励 的_基于保险代理业的研究.pdf

2010 /01 总第 393期 商业研究 COMMERCIAL RESEARCH : 1001- 148X ( 2010) 01- 0146- 05 : 1 1 2 郭心毅 , 蒲勇健 , 张东风 ( 1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400044; 2. 中国太平洋财产保险股份有限公司, 上海 200001) : 传统激励理论依据代理人为理性人的假设 提, 不能很好地解决保险代理的薪酬激励问 题行为经济学研究认为行为人并非纯自利的, 在考虑自身物质收益的同时还会关注收入的公 平性基于行为经济学中的公平偏好观点, 构建考虑物质效用和动机公平的委托- 代理模型, 研究保险代理人存在公平偏好时的激励机制结果表明公平偏好会改变激励契约结构形式和激 励效率, 互惠 是解决代理人道德风险促进保险市场健康发展的有利途径 : 公平偏好; 委托- 代理模型; 激励契约 : F84032 : A Impact Analysis of Salary Incen tiv e based on Fairness P reference - B ased on Study on Insurance A gent Service 1 1 2 GUO X in- yi, PU Yong- jian , HANG Dong- feng ( 1. School of Econom ics BusinessAdm inistration, Chong ing University, Chong ing 400044, China; 2. China P acfi ic P rop erty Insurance Comp any, Shanghai 200001, China) A bstract: The expermi ents on behaviour econom ics indicate that allpeople are not egoistical, and they not only consid er their own m aterial gain, but also concern about the fairness of incom e. Based on fairness preference view point of be haviour econom ics, th is paper stud ies a new principal- agent modelw ith m aterialutility and fairness preference and the incentivem echan ism of insurance agent. The resu lts prove that the fairness preference have influence on the contract structure and efficiency of incentive, and the reciprocity is betterw ay to reduce the agent!sm oral hazard and ensure a sound development of insurance m arket. K ey w ords: fairness preference, principal- agent, incentive contract , [ 1] [ 2] , , , , , , - ; ,