地方官员的培养 - 武汉大学经济与管理学院.pdf

地方官员的培养 - 武汉大学经济与管理学院.pdf

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地方官员的培养 - 武汉大学经济与管理学院

1978-2005 1 Cultivating local official? Evidences from China Abstract: The traditional wisdom holds that the local officials play active roles in the process of economic development in China. If so, how are they qualified? We find a special kind of governors who are transferred from the central to the local with the purpose of cultivation, and usually labeled as jingguan . The transferredjingguan accounts for 15% of all governors in China, and can be treated as a natural experiments to systematically investigate the accumulation of the competence of Chinese local officials. On the basis of thejingguan - province matched panel data, we find several strong evidences that the cost of cultivation is about 1 percentage of slowdown in the economic growth in which they govern, most of which, from the perspective of the primary distribution, is burdened by the government. It’s not surprising we also find that the cultivation yields significantly considerable improvements in the possibility of political promotion as well as economic performance. Our findings are robust, and might shed some highlights on the understanding of how the local officials are cultivated in China. Keywords:jingguan transfer; political economic growth; difference in differences JEL Classification: P160; O110 510275 020 E-mai

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