基于外部性的既有建筑节能改造业主进化博弈行为分析.PDF

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2018-10-01 发布于天津
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基于外部性的既有建筑节能改造业主进化博弈行为分析.PDF

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基于外部性的既有建筑节能改造业主进化博弈行为分析

25 6 Vol. 25 No. 6 2011 12 Journal of Engineering Management Dec. 2011 基于外部性的既有建筑节能改造业主进化博弈行为分析 300384E-mail maxn87@163.com TU-9 A 1674-8859 201106-644-05 Evolutionary Game Analysis of Owners Behavior Based on Externality in Energy Efficiency Renovation of Existing Buildings MA Xing-neng ，GUO Han-ding ，SHANG Ling （Department of Management Engineering ，Tianjin Institute of Urban Construction ，Tianjin 300384 ，China ， E-mail：maxn87@163.com ） Abstract ：It’s important to analyze the strategy choices of market entities in energy efficiency renovation of existing buildings. Based on the analysis framework of externality and bounded rationality ，this paper establishes evolutionary game model among owners in energy efficiency renovation of existing buildings without government administrative intervention and with economic incentive policies respectively. Owners′ evolutionarily stable strategy （ESS ）and replicated dynamics through game analysis among owners are analyzed. The models show that evolutionary stable strategy and replicated dynamics are affected by externality and closely related to energy efficiency renovation benefits and incentive intensity. It is reasoned out that government should increase economic incentive policy efforts to make the externality internalization and make ow