公司管理与产.pptxVIP

;;;Why should exchange of corporate property rights be permitted only under restricted conditions,whereas exchanges of noncorporate rights are not equally regulated?;Another argument for compulsory disclosure :;;;;;Ⅰ. Managers who select the innovative uses are those who bear or should bear consequent value effects.;Creating profits for owners ≠ Share those profits;Reasons: Market valuation ignored in misinterpretation of the role of profits It is ignored also in the contention that the modern stockholder’s wealth is less well protected in the dispersed than in the concentrated ownership corporation. In a corporation with dispersed ownership , if anyone knew his wealth would be given less diligent interest by corporate managers , he would pay less. ;Resolution of these two conflicting interpretations lies in the possibility. The alleged greater diversionary activity is not existed The dispersed large corporation is so advantageous in other respects that diversionary tactics of the managers are financed out of those advantages while the stockholders get as much as they would in less dispersed corporations. ; ;;Hierarchical control objectives are different in nonprofit or publicly owned enterprises from those in privately owned corporations. One objective-profitability –or effects on wealth of the owners will be given less weight in the former groups. Profitability ,combined with rights to profits,provides a clearer and stronger criterion for behavior of subordinates in for-profit corporations than in government agencies or not-for-profit enterprises. Profit-seeking or are not privately owned behavior will deviate from that in a profit-seeking corporation. ;The increase in value of potential rights to goods leads to a stronger specification of rights,does not indicate what form the specification and identification will take,or to whom the rights will be assigned initially,or whether they will be transferable. ;One attribute of property rights in goods as