政府干预、法治、金融发展及国有企业银行贷款.doc

政府干预、法治、金融发展与国有企业银行贷款* Government Intervention, Legal Enforcement, Financial Development, and Bank Loans of State-Owned Enterprises 余明桂 潘红波 Yu Minggui Pan Hongbo （大学管理学院） 通讯作者：余明桂 通讯地址：武汉市大学管理学院邮政编码：43007联系电话子信箱：mingyu@mail.hust.edu.cn 摘 要：本文分析我国各地区的政府干预、法治和金融发展对地方政府控制的国有企业的银行贷款的影响。研究结果发现，地区的法治水平和金融发展水平越高，企业获得的银行贷款越少，贷款期限越短。这个结果与“法与金融”文献的理论预期和实证结果相反。本文的经验证据表明，产生这种差异的主要原因是，地方政府有很强的动机支持辖区内的国有企业，并通过干预银行的信贷决策给这些企业提供贷款支持，而法治和金融发展可以减少地方政府干预给国有企业带来的贷款支持效应。进一步的研究发现，与法治和金融发展相比，政府干预是影响国有企业银行贷款的更为基本的制度因素。我们还发现，国有企业获得的银行贷款越多、贷款期限越长，管理层的代理成本越高、经营绩效越差。这表明，地方政府通过干预银行的信贷决策给国有企业提供的贷款支持是低效率的。。义确 会寂rguc-Kunt,问题：对中国上市公司的实证分析，南开 关键词：政府干预；法与金融；国有企业；银行贷款 Government Intervention, Legal Enforcement, Financial Development, and Bank Loans of State-Owned Enterprises Abstract: This paper tests the effect of local government intervention, legal enforcement, and financial development on the bank loans of the state-owned listed companies controlled by provincial government. The empirical results show that the legal enforcement and financial development at the provincial level are negatively related to bank credit and debt maturity. These results are contrary to the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence of “law and finance” literature. Further evidence shows that the differences of the results between this paper and the “law and finance” literature result from the facts that the local government in China has strong incentives and power to compel commercial banks to provide state-owned enterprises with favorable bank credit. And with strong law enforcement and financial development, favorable credit to the state-owned enterprises decreases. Additional evidence finds that compared to law enforcement and financial development, government intervention has more essential effe