经济博弈论_Chapter11.pdf

囚徒困境和重复博弈 ThThe PPriisoners’’ DilDilemma andand RepeatedRepeated GamesGames 第11章 ChapterChapter 1111 囚徒困境 Priisoners’ Dililemma 囚徒困境是这样一个博弈：每个参与者有一个 优势策略优势策略，但是当所有参与者都使用他们这但是当所有参与者都使用他们这一 优势策略时，所产生的均衡带给每个人的结果 比他们都使用劣势策略比他们都使用劣势策略还要差要差。 The prisoners’ dilemma is a game in which each player has a dominant strategy, but the equilibrium that arises when all players use their dominant strategiesstrategies providesprovides aa worseworse outcomeoutcome forfor every player than would arise if they all usedused theirtheir dominateddominated strategiesstrategies insteadinstead. Slide 2 囚徒困境 Priisoners’ Dililemma 本章考虑囚徒困境中的参与者是否以本章考虑囚徒困境中的参与者是否以及如何能够获得如何能够获得 和保持对他们都有利的合作结果，克服为了自身利益 而背叛的个人激励而背叛的个人激励。。 In this chapter, we consider whether and how the players in a prisoners’ dilemma can attain andand sustainsustain theirtheir mutuallymutually beneficialbeneficial cooperative outcome, overcoming their sepparate incentives to defect for individual gain. 四种解 Four categories of solutions:  重复重复 RRepetiitiion  惩罚和奖励 Penalty and reward  领导领导 Leadershipp  不对称信息Asymmetric Information （自学，或见作业3 最后1题） Slide 3 内容提要 Outline 基本博弈（回顾） The Basic Game ((Review)) 解之一：重复 Solutions I: Repetition 解之二：惩罚和奖励 Solutions II: Penalties and Rewards 解之三 领导 解之三：领导 Solutions III: Leadership 实验证据实验证据 Experimental Evidence 真实世界中的囚徒困境 RReall-worldld DilDilemmas Slide 4 基本博弈（回顾） The Basic Game (Review) WIFE Confess Den