台海问题的博弈分析：核威慑与有限战争.pdf

* a b 510275 A Game-Theory Approach to the Taiwan Strait Issue: Nuclear Threat and Limited War WANG Xi LI Jie ( Lingnan College, Sun Yat-Sen University ) Abstract: The paper extends the basic framework of the Taiwan Strait game among Taiwan authority, mainland China and the U.S. to explore Sino-U.S. conflict-level issues. By incorporating nuclear war option in the game, we derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and prove that mainland China possesses a credible nuclear threat so that if it declares war against Taiwan, America will not intervene by force. Further incorporation of the PRC’s limited war choice manifests that a full-fledged war maintains the credibility of Beijing’s nuclear war threat, while limited war action of Beijing loses the credibility. Conclusions are also drawn on the chance of a large-scale Sino-U.S. military conflict and the PRC’s choice of conflict level in face of external shocks. Key words: Taiwan Strait Issue, Game, Nuclear Threat, Limited War Jel Classification: C72 P48 Z19 a 1970 Frontiers of Economics in China 2005 b 1977 Frontiers of Economics in China China Economic Review * common knowledge 200504 200511Gregory Chow