国外博弈论课件lecture16.ppt

June 11, 2003 73-347 Game Theory--Lecture 16 June 11, 2003 Lecture 16 Dynamic Games of Complete Information Dynamic Games of Complete and Imperfect Information Outline of dynamic games of complete information Dynamic games of complete information Extensive-form representation Dynamic games of complete and perfect information Game tree Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium Backward induction Applications Dynamic games of complete and imperfect information More applications Repeated games Today’s Agenda Review of previous class Game tree representing imperfect information Subgame Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium Backward induction Dynamic (or sequential-move) games of complete information A set of players Who moves when and what action choices are available? What do players know when they move? Players’ payoffs are determined by their choices. All these are common knowledge among the players. Definition: extensive-form representation The extensive-form representation of a game specifies: the players in the game when each player has the move what each player can do at each of his or her opportunities to move what each player knows at each of his or her opportunities to move the payoff received by each player for each combination of moves that could be chosen by the players Dynamic games of complete and perfect information Perfect information All previous moves are observed before the next move is chosen. A player knows Who has made What choices when she has an opportunity to make a choice Perfect information: illustration (sequential matching pennies) Each of the two players has a penny. Player 1 first chooses whether to show the Head or the Tail. After observing player 1’s choice, player 2 chooses to show Head or Tail Both players know the following rules: If two pennies match (both heads or both tails) then player 2 wins player 1’s penny. Otherwise, player 1 wins player 2’s penny. Dynamic games of complete and imperfect information Imperfect information A player m