优化资本结构：思考经济和其他价值资本结构外文文献翻译.doc

西安工业大学北方信息工程学院 毕业设计论文外文翻译资料 系 别管理信息系 专 业 财务管理 班 级 B080510 姓 名 郭 静 学 号 导 师 王化中Optimal Capital Structure: Reflections on economic and other values By Marc Schauten Jaap Spronk1 1. Introduction Despite a vast literature on the capital structure of the firm see Harris and Raviv, 1991, Graham and Harvey, 2001, Brav et al., 2005, for overviews there still is a big gap between theory and practice see e.g. Cools, 1993, Tempelaar, 1991, Boot Cools, 1997. Starting with the seminal work by Modigliani Miller 1958, 1963, much attention has been paid to the optimality of capital structure from the shareholders’ point of view Over the last few decades studies have been produced on the effect of other stakeholders’ interests on capital structure. Well-known examples are the interests of customers who receive product or service guarantees from the company see e.g. Grinblatt Titman, 2002. Another area that has received considerable attention is the relation between managerial incentives and capital structure Ibid.. Furthermore, the issue of corporate control2 see Jensen Ruback, 1983 and, related, the issue of corporate governance3 see Shleifer Vishney, 1997, receive a lion’s part of the more recent academic attention for capital structure decisions From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision or rather, the management of the capital structure over time involves more issues than the imization of the firm’s market value alone. In this paper, we give an overview of the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the literature. We make a distinction between two broadly defined situations. The first is the traditional case of the firm that strives for the imization of the value of the shares for the current shareholders. Whenever other considerations than value imization enter capital structure decisions, these considerations have to be