外文翻译《财务报告和矛盾的管理动机：管理层收购案例》.doc

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE informs Vol. 54, No. 10, October 2008, pp. 1700–1714 doi 10.1287/mnsc.1080.0895 issn 0025-1909 _ eissn 1526-5501 _ 08 _ 5410 _ 1700 .2008 INFORMS Financial Reporting and Conflicting Managerial Incentives: The Case of Management Buyouts Paul E. Fischer, Henock Louis Accounting Department, Smeal College of Business, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802 {pef5@psu.edu, hul4@psu.edu} We analyze the effect of external financing concerns on managers’ financial reporting behavior prior tomanagement buyouts (MBOs). Prior studies hypothesize that managers intending to undertake an MBO have an incentive to manage earnings downward to reduce the purchase price. We hypothesize that managers also face a conflicting reporting incentive associated with their efforts to obtain external 、、financing for the MBO and to lower their financing cost. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that managers who rely the most on external funds to finance their MBOs tend to report less negative abnormal accrual prior to the MBOs. In addition, the relation between external financing and abnormal accruals is tempered when there are more fixed assets that can serve as collateral for debt financing. Key words: MBO; earnings management; debt financing; managerial incentives History: Accepted by Stefan Reichelstein, accounting; received June 16, 2007. This paper was with the authors 2 months for 1 revision. Published online in Articles in Advance September 5, 2008. 题目：财务报告和矛盾的管理动机：管理层收购案例 作者：保罗E·菲舍尔，埃诺克·路易，斯米尔商学院会计系，美国宾夕法尼亚州立大学 出处：Management Science 54(10), pp.1700–1714，2008 INFORMS 文章结构： 第1部分是对文章写作目的的介绍，第2部分介绍了关于MBO融资的一些背景资料。第3部分讨论管理层在MBO前作出矛盾报告的动机，并以此来制定假设。第4部分介绍了盈余管理的代理。第5部分介绍了样本选择过程，并展示了一些统计数据。第6部分报告MBO前盈余管理的变量分析结果和盈余管理与MBO融资源头之间的相互关系。第7部分报告了基于盈余管理和外部融资之间联系的多元化收益。第8部分是研究的总结。 译文： 财务报告和矛盾的管理动机：管理层收购案例 摘要： 我们就以往管理层收购（MBOs）前管理层的财务报告行为对外部融资问题的影响进行了分析。此前的