The Cambridge Companion To Spinoza 2 Bennett Spinozas Metaphysics英文电子书.pdf

JONATHAN BENNETT 2 Spinozas metaphysics In this chapter I shall present two problems which dominate Spi- nozas metaphysics (sections 1-2), and then present his solution of one of them through his doctrine that there is only extended sub- stance (sections 3-6). After a brief interlude looking at his views about necessity and time (sections 7-8), I then turn to Spinozas treatment of the second problem, in his theory about how mentality fits into the universe (sections 9-14). Most of the references are to the Ethics Part 1 and the first few propositions of Part 2. I . SOME UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS The main outlines of Spinozas metaphysical system are his re- sponse to two problems inherited from Descartess philosophy. They existed as problems for him because of certain assumptions that he made at too deep a level for him to recognize them as items of doctrine. I shall pick out four of these. (1) Explanatory rationalism. There is a satisfying answer to every Why? question. (Leibniz was also a rationalist in this sense; Des- cartes was not.) Associated with this is a view about, or attitude toward, causation. Spinoza did not distinguish what is absolutely or logically necessary from what is merely causally necessary. In his way of thinking, there is a single relation of necessary connection, which links causes with effects in real causal chains and premises with conclusions in valid arguments. Those of us who do distinguish these will want to know how Spinoza collapses them into one. Does he regard absolute necessity as weaker than it really is, or does he regard causal necessity as stronger than it really is? There may be no clear- cut answer to this, but the latter is closer to the truth than the former. 61 Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University P