上市公司会计信息披露的博弈分析及其政府规制.pdf

Economic Management Journal December 2013, Volume 2, Issue 5, PP.202-207 Game Analysis of Accounting Information Disclosure of Listed Companies and the Government Regulation Xiaoming Yan Business School East China University of politic and Law, Shanghai 200042, China Email: ym1967@21 Abstract Based on the prevailing distortion of accounting information disclosure of listed companies in China, this paper constructed a signaling game model between listed company and medium and small investors about accounting information disclosure. Through the refined Bayesian equilibrium of the game model, it is that if the government supervision is absent on accounting information disclosure of listed companies, there is pooling equilibrium that financial status of listed company is no matter good or bad, that is to say, the listed company will disclose good accounting information, and thus investors can choose investment strategy. So the strict oversight and regulation taken by government regulators are required on the listed companies’ accounting information disclosure in terms of the following three aspects to effectively solve the pooling equilibrium of accounting information disclosure of listed companies: First is to increase the odds  of false accounting information disclosure of listed companies; then the aggravation of fraud penalties Y on listed companies due to their false accounting information; finally, the rise of compensation X for victims of false accounting information. After the government regulation, when penalties Y and compensation X are sufficiently large, B 1 + E 1 –C X and I 1 -B 2 -C F Y +X . The signaling game of accounting information disclosure of listed companies shows separating equil