组织的经济学与管理学（英文）ch05_Principal_agent_models教材教学课件.ppt

Chapter 5 Principal-agent models George Hendrikse;What is wrong with the fundamental welfare theorem / Coase theorem?;Problems with property rights are due to Inadequate institutions; Inefficient structure of property, i.e. income and decision, rights.;Inadequate institutions;Inefficient structure of property rights;One of the parties to an exchange/transaction has more complete knowledge than does the other, which asymmetry condition is costly to overcome and gives rise to a trading hazard. Sometimes markets fail for that reason. (Akerlof, 1970) Organisational responses often occur that serve to mitigate that hazard.Two responses can be distinguished:1. an incentive response (Jensen Meckling) 2. a metering response (Alchian Demsetz).;Asymmetric information results in complete, instead of complete contingent, contracts.;Figure 5.2: Types of contract;Figure III: Positioning of part III ;Self-interested versus opportunistic behaviour;Figure 5.8: The firm as a nexus of contracts ;Figure 5.9: View of the firm in complete contracting theory;Two motivation / incentive problems;Principal-agent relationship;Examples;An interesting principal-agent relationship has three ingredients;Surplus available;There is a conflict of interests when the increase of a variable benefits one party and goes at the expense of the other party.;Asymmetric information;Figure 5.1: Complete contracting theory;Two types of asymmetric information;Two principal-agent models;Figure 5.3: Asymmetric information in complete contracting models;Ex post information asymmetry;Figure 5.4: The hidden action model;Ex ante information asymmetry;Figure 5.5: Ingredients in the hidden characteristics model;Hidden action models are also called moral hazard models.Hidden characteristics models are also called adverse selection models.;‘Hidden action’ and ‘hidden characteristics’ relate to the ingredients of specific principal-agent models. ‘Moral hazard’ and ‘adverse selection’ refer to (po