组织的经济学与管理学（英文）ch08_Transaction_and_influence_costs教材教学课件.ppt

Chapter 8 Transaction and influence costs George Hendrikse;What is a firm? Coase (1937);What is the difference between the employer-employee relationship and the customer-grocer relationship? According to Alchian and Demsetz there is no difference.;“I can ‘punish’ you only by withholding future business or by seeking redress in the courts for any failure to honour our exchange agreement. This is exactly all an employer can do. He can fire or sue, just as I can fire or sue my grocer by stopping purchasing from him or sue him for delivering faulty products.” ;A realistic organisation theory is not possible with complete (contingent) contracts;Figure IV.2: Positioning ;Part IV: Nexus of incomplete contracts;Bounded rationality;Solution;There are two behavioural assumptions in TCE;There are three environmental variables;Transaction costs;Organisational solutions are chosen to minimise transaction costs, i.e. to limit the hazards associated with incomplete contracts.;Figure 8.5: Transaction costs economics ;Possible governance structures;Asset specificity;Types of asset specificity;Sunk costs;Relationship specific investments are vulnerable for ex post opportunistic behaviour.;Fundamental transformation;Hold-up problem;Quasi-surplus;Example: Developing software;Surplus  = value – costs  = 240 – 200 = 40Quasi-surplus  = surplus + sunk costs  = 40 + K;Figure 8.1: Composition of the revenues ;Figure 8.2: Reservation prices / threatpoints before and after the fundamental transformation ;Figure 8.3: Contract prices before and after the fundamental transformation ;Strategic situation ;What is efficient?;What will happen?;Hold-up ;Subgame perfect equilibrium;Hold-up;Hold-up problem;Subgame perfect equilibrium;Equilibrium payoffs;This equilibrium is inefficient because each party can earn 20. ;Conclusion / problem;Solution;Consider vertical integration;Vertical integration entails that the contract will be honoured, according to Williamson. ;Strategic sit