组织的经济学与管理学（英文）ch09_Property_rights_theory教材教学课件.ppt

Chapter 9 Property rights theory George Hendrikse;Transaction costs economics (Williamson);Property rights theory;It is not consistent to assume that, in an integrated enterprise, people do not behave opportunistically anymore.;Strategic situation;Firm;Ownership entails the possession of the residual decision rights.;Questions in property rights theory;‘Asset ownership’ and ‘being essential / indispensable’ is captured by the Shapley value.;The choice of investment (level of asset specificity) determines the bargaining position.;Start with analysing the second and third stage of the game, while taking a certain first stage decision as given.;Result An investor is willing to worsen his bargaining position (by choosing K0) when he is assigned a lot of bargaining power in the choice of governance structure. (This gives him confidence that he receives his money back.) ;ImplicationAn owner-manager invests more when he owns more assets. ;Example: Developing software;Division of quasi-surplus in governance structure;Which governance structures result in the efficient investment decisions?;BI;Every governance structure results in the efficient investment decision.;This case K = 0 reflects the Coase theorem!;BI;Conclusion;BI;Conclusion;Represent the above using figures instead of tree diagrams.;Bargaining positions;Figure: 9.12: Bargaining positions before the fundamental transformation;Bargaining positions before fundamental transformation;Figure: 9.13: Bargaining positions after the fundamental transformation;Bargaining positions after fundamental transformation;Conclusion;Why is an investor willing to deteriorate its ex post bargaining position?;Allocating sufficient bargaining power to the investor provides enough confidence that the investment will be recouped.;How is this done? The choice of governance structure determines the distribution of bargaining power!;Payoff upstream investor;Bargaining power of parties in governance structure G;Figure 9.15: Governa