组织的经济学与管理学（英文）ch10_Self-enforcing_contracts教材教学课件.ppt

Chapter 10 Self-enforcing contracts George Hendrikse;Folk theorem;Prisoners dilemma;Aside: experimental evidence regarding the Prisoners Dilemma;Observation:Nash regarding these experimental resultsThe flaw in the experiment as a test of equilibrium point theory is that the experiment really amounts to having the players play one large multi-player game. One cannot just as well think of the thing as a sequence of independent games as one can in zero-sum cases. There is just too much interaction … (AER, 2001, p 1403). ;A non-cooperative game consists of 5 ingredients;The Folk theorem resolves the prisoners dilemma;Figure 10.1: Folk theorem ;TrustRelational contractsReciprocity;Formal authority resides at the top, while real authority can be delegated or not.;There is a tradeoff between: search incentives for the employee private activities of the employee ;Self-enforcing contracts and asset ownership;The incentive to renege depends on who owns the asset because it determines the bargaining positions.