组织的经济学与管理学（英文）ch11_Strategy_typology教材教学课件.ppt

Chapter 11 Strategy typology George Hendrikse;Topics;1. Decision sequence in the strategy-taxonomy;Eight games will be distinguished in the strategy typology ;2. Reaction function;The reaction function has a negative slope when there is quantity competition;The reaction function has a positive slope when there is price competition;Nash-equilibrium in a market with quantity competition;An aggressive action is met by a passive response when there is quantity competition;An aggressive action is met by an aggressive response when there is price competition;Comparative statics results ;An investment is hard (soft) when there is a negative (positive) relationship between the investment level of the incumbent and the profit level of the entrant.;The investment in the first stage of the game commits the incumbent to a certain location of R1 in the third stage of the game.;If entry is inevitable, then the investment choice of the incumbent has to be such that nice / passive behaviour is elicited by the entrant.;A market with strategic substitutes in which entry is inevitable;Subgame perfect equilibrium profile in a market with strategic substitutes when entry is inevitable;A market with strategic complements in which entry is inevitable;Subgame perfect equilibrium profile in a market with strategic complements when entry is inevitable;If entry can be deterred, then the incumbent has to invest in an aggressive profile in order to make the market unattractive for the entrant.;A market with strategic substitutes in which entry can be deterred;Subgame perfect equilibrium profile in a market with strategic substitutes when entry can be deterred;A market with strategic complements in which entry can be deterred;Subgame perfect equilibrium profile in a market with strategic complements when entry can be deterred;The nature of investment determines whether the desired profile of the incumbent is established by a L(ow) or H(igh) level of investment.;Subgame perfect equil