上海财经大学经济学院高级微观经济学三课件,习题,答案.pdf

Course Outline 1. Nash Equilibrium, Mixed Strategies, Rationalizability, Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies, Level-k Models. *OR: Ch. 2, 3.1-2, Ch. 4 Bernheim, D.1984. Ratinoalizable Strategic Behavior. Econometrica 52:1007- 1028. Dekel and Fudenberg, 1990, Rational Behavior with Payo§ Uncertainty, Journal of Economic Theory, V52:243-267. Gul, Faruk, 1996, Rationality and Coherent Theories of Strategic Behavior, Jour- nal of Economic Theory, V70:1-31. Pearce, 1984, Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection, Econometrica, 52:1029-1050. Bosch-Domenech et. al., 2002, ìOne, Two, (Three), InÖnity,...: Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest ExperimentsîAER Vol.92. Marx and Swinkels, 1997, Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance, Games and Economic Behavior, V18:219-245. 2. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, Correlated Equilibrium *OR: Ch. 3.3 Brandenberger, A and E. Dekel, 1993, Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowl- edge, Journal of Economic Theory, 59:189-198. Brandenberger, A and E. Dekel, 1987, Rationalizability and Correlated Equi- librium, Econometrica 55:1391-1402. 3. Common Knowledge, Common Prior, and No-Trade Theorems. *OR Chapter 5.1-3 Lipman, Barton, 2003, Finite Order Implications of Common Priors, Economet- rica, V71:1225-1267. Milgrom and Stokey, 1982, Information, Trade and Common Knowledge, Journal of Economic Theory, 26, 17-27. Morris, Stephen, 1994, Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information, Econometrica, Vol. 62, 1327-1347. Dov Samet, 1998, ìCommon Priors and Separation of Convex Sets,îGames and Economic Behavior 24,172-174. 4. Committee Decision Feddersen, T. and W. Pesendorfer, 1998, ìConvicting the Innocent: The inferi- ority of Unanimous Jury Verdict,îAmerican Political Science Review, 92:23-35. Li, Hao, S. Rosen, and W. S