Aunifyingviewofthebasisofsocialcognition中文译文.doc

PAGE21 / NUMPAGES21 A unifying(联合的) view of the basis（基础） of social cognition Vittorio Gallese1, Christian Keysers1,2 and Giacomo Rizzolatti1 Department系 of Neuroscience, Section章节 of Physiology生理学, University of Parma, Italy BCN Neuroimaging神经影像 Center, University of Groningen, Antonius Deusinglaan 2, Groningen, The Netherlands In this article we provide a unifying neural hypothesis on how individuals understand the actions and emotions of others. 在这篇文章中我们对个体是如何理解别人的行动和感情的这一现象提供了一种联合的神经学的假设。 Our main claim is that the fundamental基本的 mechanism机械装置 at the basis of the experiential经验的 understanding of others’ actions is the activation激活 of the mirror 镜子neuron system. 我们的主要观点是，用来理解别人的行为基本装置是“mirror neuron system”（镜像神经系统）的激活. A similar mechanism, but involving the activation of viscero发动机-motor centers, underlies在。。之下 the experiential understanding of the emotions of others. 理解别人的情感的基本装置是一种相似的装置，但它包含一个“viscera-motor centers”（ “内脏发动机中心”）。 Humans are an exquisitely精致 social species物种. Our survival and success depends crucially至关重要的 on our ability to thrive茁壮成长 in complex social situations. One of the most striking突出的features of our experience of others is its intuitive凭直觉感知的 nature.This implicit含蓄的，不言说的 grasp抓住，领会 of what other people do or feel will be the focus of our review回顾. We will posit假定 that, in our brain,there are neural mechanisms (mirror mechanisms) that allow us to directly understand the meaning of the actions and emotions of others by internally replicating复制 (‘simulat-simulating’) them without any explicit明确的 re?ective mediation调解. 我们假定，在我们的脑中，有神经装置允许我们通过在没有任何明确调解的前提下直接理解别人的行为的和情感的含义。 Conceptual reasoning is not necessary for this understanding. 概念推理对于这种理解并不是必要的。 As human beings, of course, we are able to reason about others and to use this capacity能力 to understand other people’s minds at the conceptual，declarative？声明的 level. 作为人类，我们能够推出别人（的行为或情感），我们当然可以用这种能力在概念的、陈述的水平上来理解别人。 Here we will argue, however, that the fundamental mechanism that allo