发展中的声誉.pdf

Developing a Reputation for Reticence MICHAEL D. GRUBB MIT Sloan School of Management 77 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02139-4307 mgrubb@ A sender who has disclosable information with probability less than one may partially conceal bad news by choosing to withhold information and pooling with uninformed types. The success of this strategy depends on receivers’ beliefs about the probability that the sender has disclosable news. In a dynamic context, informed senders try to cultivate a reputation for reticence either by concealing good news along with the bad, or by concealing some good news and disclosing some bad news. A reputation for reticence is valuable because it makes receivers less skeptical of past or future nondisclosures. The model provides insight into the choice by firms such as Google not to disclose quarterly earnings guidance to analysts, as well as Tony Blair’s reticence over his son’s vaccine record during the measles–mumps–rubella scare in the United Kingdom. 1. Introduction When does it make sense to tell the truth, but not the whole truth? Managers must avoid making objectively false statements to investors, as these could later lead to large lawsuits or prison time. However, telling the truth does not necessarily require telling the whole truth. Managers may be able to withhold information or delay its release in order to “manage” earnings and manipulate their firm’s share price. Similar features are present in communication between voters and a politician who must decide how much to reveal about past indiscretions, as well as in communication between buyers and a seller who must decide how much to reveal about product quality. The seminal “unraveling” result