关联交易视角下的控股股东掏空行为与盈余质量分析-analysis of tunneling behavior and earnings quality of controlling shareholders from the perspective of related party transactions.docx

关联交易视角下的控股股东掏空行为与盈余质量分析-analysis of tunneling behavior and earnings quality of controlling shareholders from the perspective of related party transactions.docx

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关联交易视角下的控股股东掏空行为与盈余质量分析-analysis of tunneling behavior and earnings quality of controlling shareholders from the perspective of related party transactions

优秀毕业论文 精品参考文献资料 Abstract Since 2006 the implementation of equity division reform has made outstanding achievements, make our country capital market to meet the arrival of the full circulation period, the listed companies’ governance structure in our country have also improved, but due to the special institutional background in our country, the problem which the controlling shareholders encroach on the interests of minority shareholders and tunneling company resources still is our country capital markets ills. Controlling shareholders in order to conceal the tunneling behavior, to do the earnings management of listed companies, provide false financial statements, hide the real corporate operational performance and seriously reduces the profitability of the company, not only make investors face huge risk, but also seriously hindered the healthy development of capital market in our country. This paper that based on the perspective of related transactions put tunneling behavior controlling shareholders and earning quality and incorporated into the analysis framework by combining theoretical analysis and empirical research methods, to analyze the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders of listed companies in China effect on the quality of the surplus. Controlling shareholders of listed companies in our country often occupy the interests of minority shareholders, this paper for this phenomenon firstly theoretical analysis of the causes of the controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior, and then analyzes the related transactions which as the main way of the controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior and its status quo, secondly the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen a-share listed companies in the manufacturing industry as samples from 2009 to 2011, the degree of related transactions as indirect measure, empirical research on the controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior of listed companies in our country impact on earnings quality. In this paper, the research re

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