国有控股上市公司管理层股权激励与企业避税的实证分析-empirical analysis on management equity incentive and corporate tax avoidance of state-owned holding listed companies.docx

国有控股上市公司管理层股权激励与企业避税的实证分析-empirical analysis on management equity incentive and corporate tax avoidance of state-owned holding listed companies.docx

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国有控股上市公司管理层股权激励与企业避税的实证分析-empirical analysis on management equity incentive and corporate tax avoidance of state-owned holding listed companies

AbstractThis paper focuses on the prominent question of domestic and foreign tax evasion and avoidance, through the theory of stock-option incentives we has established the theoretical model about the relation between the degree of corporate income tax avoidance and management stock-option incentives, and had proven the conclusion accuracy by using empirical methods. In the foundation of reviewing the domestic and foreign related literatures, we start to explore with the question whether high quota management incentives can actually cause the corporate income tax avoidance behavior to be worse. This article comparatively analysis the definitions of tax evasion and avoidance, and introduces the theory of stock-option incentives and management rent seeking theory to establish the theoretical model. Then we became to define these important variables, such as the degree of tax avoidance, management stock-option incentives, and the management power, as well as some controlled variables, and established a regression model about the degree of tax avoidance with independent variables .The main topic of this paper is: how to measure the extent of corporate tax avoidance indicators? How to design a relational model of corporate tax avoidance and management equity incentive? The state-controlled listed companies management equity incentive level degree of corporate income tax to avoid will cause what impact? In this paper, several conclusions: First, the management equity incentive levels showed a significant positive correlation evade taxes degree of relationship between. Given more stock-option incentives, the management’s interest would converge more with the all shareholders. To realize the shareholder’s value maximization, the management will achieve this goal through the avoiding taxes. Third, there are positive relationships between the variables. Finally, if there is more incentive, relative to the private listed companies, state-owned holding listed companies will not

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